When Algerian nationalists launched a rebellion against French rule in November 1954, France was forced to cope with a varied and adaptable Algerian strategy. In this volume, originally published in 1963, David Galula reconstructs the story of his highly successful command at the height of the rebellion. This groundbreaking work, with a new foreword by Bruce Hoffman, remains relevant to present-day counterinsurgency operations.

This is a reproduction of a book published before 1923. This book may have occasional imperfections such as missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. that were either part of the original artifact, or were introduced by the scanning process. We believe this work is culturally important, and despite the imperfections, have elected to bring it back into print as part of our continuing commitment to the preservation of printed works worldwide. We appreciate your understanding of the imperfections in the preservation process, and hope you enjoy this valuable book.

"an excellent work . . . mercifully free of abstract pontification. . . . [The University of California] Vietnam War Archive, with its sections on psychological warfare; propaganda analysis; political warfare; the VC's political dau tranh or struggle strategy and its three van or action programs, etc.perhaps a total of 150,000 pagescontains nothing that matches [More Than a Soldier's War.]"Douglas Pike, Indochina Studies Project, University of California

"More Than a Soldier's War is a powerful, affecting story of distinguished service up to a tragic end. . . . It is a splendid account . . . Moreover, it is exceedingly thoughtful, and fascinating to boot."Robert W. Komer, former Assistant to President Johnson and Chief Advisor on Pacification to the Government of Vietnam

" . . . there are . . . officers whose stories can lend a perspective to the war that is available no other way. One such story is More Than a Soldier's War."California Zephyr, Vietnam Veterans of California newsletter

" . . . a well-written, fact-filled memoir . . . "VVA Veteran, July 1996

"Hundreds of books have been written about the American experience in Viet-Nam, however, few have been written about the advisory effort in general and the pacification effort specifically. Col. Metzner's book does an excellent job in filling this gap."Military: The Press of Freedom, May, 1997

". . . a clear and honest description and evaluation of a cooperative program by the United States and Vietnam that was almost never reported in the media. . . . Colonel Metzner gives a very frank and well-organized explanation of the program. . . . Colonel Metzner is a gifted writer and his book tells an important part of our history, which certainly needed telling. It gives us a reason to be proud of the work done by the Pacification program."Purple Heart Magazine, rec'd Aug. 1997

". . . a major Vietnam literature contribution. Metzner plainly highlights the problems of advising a foreign army and its people, . . . The lessons he identifies are valuable for the US military in any future advisory effort."Military Review, May/June 1997

"Colonel Metzner's account of the workings of the pacification program at the local level in the provinces, districts and villages of Vietnam fills an important gap in the history of the war there, which is otherwise too dominated by the `soldier's war' which most Americans experienced. He is honest in his frustrations, but also in his recognition that the program did have a major impact in bring peace and progress to the countryside where most Vietnamese lived. It won the `people's war' against the communists, only to see that the `soldier's war' to which they later turned overwhelmed a Vietnam abandoned by its American protector."William E. Colby

"I have read your book More Than a Soldier's War. I must congratulate you for having transformed a normally unglamorous provincial advisory role into an exciting experience. And you have done an excellent job of, as you put it, `telling the story faithfully and accurately.'. . . Finally, I am glad that we had advisors like yourself who had a profound empathy for the plight of Vietnamese people and who tried hard to help."Lam Quang Thi, Lt. Gen., ARVN

"An authoritative description of the war in the boondocks with valuable research material and case studies for historians to employ."Indochina Chronology, April-June 1998

Consider the following: The United States is engaged in what some political and media leaders call an immoral war, a war that did not have to be fought. After a relatively easy initial conquest, the US Army finds itself faced with armed resistance to US occupation. US strategic goals have changed since the war began; domestic political opposition increases as insurgent activities prolong the war. Insurgent leaders monitor US domestic politics and adjust their strategy accordingly. US Army Soldiers adapt to the uncertainty and employ novel techniques to complex military and nonmilitary problems in a land where they are strangers and about which they have little understanding. Does this sound familiar? It should, but this description does not depict events from 2003 to 2007 in the Middle East—it describes events from 1898 to 1902 in the Philippines.

Combat Studies Institute (CSI) is pleased to publish its 24th Long War Series Occasional Paper, Savage Wars of Peace: Case Studies of Pacification in the Philippines, 1900–1902, by CSI historian Robert Ramsey. In it he analyzes case studies from two key Philippine military districts and highlights several themes that are relevant to today’s ongoing operations in the Long War. Between 1899 and 1902 the US Army was successful in defeating Filipino resistance to American occupation using what military leaders at the time called a combination of attraction and coercion. However, success came only after initial setbacks, disappointments, and significant changes in leadership, military strategy, and political adaptation.

In the two regions of the Luzon Island analyzed in this occasional paper, Army leaders employed a mix of political and economic incentives, combined with military actions and strict martial law to subdue the resistance. The geographic isolation of the insurrectos on the Philippine archipelago was also an advantage for US forces. The capture of key insurrecto leaders provided critical intelligence, and their post-capture pledge of support for the new government helped break the resistance by 1902.

This work highlights, among many other themes, the importance of perseverance, adaptability, and cultural understanding. Written at the request of the Command and General Staff College for use in their curriculum, we believe this occasional paper will be a valuable addition to the professional development of all Army leaders. CSI—The Past Is Prologue!

Timothy R. Reese
Colonel, Armor
Director, Combat Studies Institute

Consider the following: The United States is engaged in what some political and media leaders call an immoral war, a war that did not have to be fought. After a relatively easy initial conquest, the US Army finds itself faced with armed resistance to US occupation. US strategic goals have changed since the war began; domestic political opposition increases as insurgent activities prolong the war. Insurgent leaders monitor US domestic politics and adjust their strategy accordingly. US Army Soldiers adapt to the uncertainty and employ novel techniques to complex military and nonmilitary problems in a land where they are strangers and about which they have little understanding. Does this sound familiar? It should, but this description does not depict events from 2003 to 2007 in the Middle East—it describes events from 1898 to 1902 in the Philippines.

Combat Studies Institute (CSI) is pleased to publish its 24th Long War Series Occasional Paper, Savage Wars of Peace: Case Studies of Pacification in the Philippines, 1900–1902, by CSI historian Robert Ramsey. In it he analyzes case studies from two key Philippine military districts and highlights several themes that are relevant to today’s ongoing operations in the Long War. Between 1899 and 1902 the US Army was successful in defeating Filipino resistance to American occupation using what military leaders at the time called a combination of attraction and coercion. However, success came only after initial setbacks, disappointments, and significant changes in leadership, military strategy, and political adaptation.

In the two regions of the Luzon Island analyzed in this occasional paper, Army leaders employed a mix of political and economic incentives, combined with military actions and strict martial law to subdue the resistance. The geographic isolation of the insurrectos on the Philippine archipelago was also an advantage for US forces. The capture of key insurrecto leaders provided critical intelligence, and their post-capture pledge of support for the new government helped break the resistance by 1902.

This work highlights, among many other themes, the importance of perseverance, adaptability, and cultural understanding. Written at the request of the Command and General Staff College for use in their curriculum, we believe this occasional paper will be a valuable addition to the professional development of all Army leaders. CSI—The Past Is Prologue!

Timothy R. Reese
Colonel, Armor
Director, Combat Studies Institute

The book introduces the print-series Taiheiki eiyu den or Heroic Biographies from the 'Tale of Grand Pacification', designed by Utagawa Kuniyoshi (1797-1861), who is considered the founder of the heroic genre in Japanese prints. The series is devoted to the final years of the sixteenth century civil wars and the key figure of the day, Toyotomi Hideyoshi (1536?-98). All fifty prints of the series are reproduced in full colour. Each print is accompanied by a translation of the extensive texts incorporated into the composition and detailed historical and cultural commentaries. The introductory essay reviews the peculiarities of Kuniyoshi’s warrior images, explores the roots of Toyotomi Hideyoshi’s popularity and discusses the texts in the prints as a source of information on the late medieval warriors’ outlook and battlefield practices.

This work examines the conflict between movements and regimes using dynamic mathematical modeling methods. Most of the deaths from political violence in the world in this century have not been caused by war, but by conflict between governments and dissenters. It is hoped that scholars will improve their understanding of these conflicts, and thus help to reduce the costs.